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DEVELOPMENT, "CULTURE," AND THE 
PROMISE CF MODERN PROGRESS 
DEBORAH A. THOMAS" 
ABSTRACT 
This essay investigates the key tensions that arise within Jamaica's new 
cultural policy "Toward Jamaica the Cultural Superstate." The argument 
presented in the paper is that "culture" is a tricky and potentially 
dangerous site upon which to hinge national development goals, even 
though the expansion of cultural industries may well represent a viable 
and potentially lucrative strategy for economic development. This is 
because invariably, "culture" cannot do the work policy makers would like 
it to do, and its invocation within policy spheres usually already signals a 
kind of developmental distress, a perceived need for retooling through a 
form of social engineering. In other words, "culture" (in the anthro-
pological sense) re.fleets and shapes, yet cannot in and of itself solve the 
most pressing challenges facing Jamaica today. 
In thinking through the links between cultural development and 
economic growth, we are confronted with a constant tension: 
culture as a set of symbolic goods vs. culture as a "way of life." 
Attempts to institutionalize these links entrench us within another 
tension, that between cultural policy for economic development 
and cultural policy for social development. While the latter raises 
issues related to the preservation of national, regional, and local 
cultures as foundations for community identities, the former 
interrogates processes of modernization (and currently, globaliza-
tion). Both directions are undergirded by a series of assumptions 
about the relationships between states and citizens, between leaders 
and "ordinary people," and between values and economic 
productivity. In this essay, I want to explore some of these 
"' This essay has benefited from the critical commentary of several individuals 
including Patricia Northover, Annie Paul, Sonjah Stanley-Niaah and the 
anonymous readers for Social and Economic Studies. I am also indebted to Pat 
Northover for inviting me to present a version of this essay at the 6th Annual 
Conference of the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, 17-
18 March 2005, and to my fellow panelists Michaeline Crichlow and Pat 
Northover, Percy Hintzen, Sidney Bartley, discussant Sonjah Stanley-Niaah, and 
several students in the audience for the rigourous and thoughtful discussion that 
ensued. 
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assumptions by thinking through the ways culture becomes 
mobilized through policy as an instrument of governance. To do 
this, and to raise questions about the act of cultural policy-making 
more generally, I will offer a critical ethnographic reading of 
Jamaica's new cultural policy, "Toward Jamaica the Cultural 
Superstate." Ultimately, I will argue that "culture" is a tricky and 
potentially dangerous site upon which to hinge national 
development goals, even though the expansion of cultural 
industries may well represent a viable and potentially lucrative 
strategy for economic development. This is because invariably, 
"culture" cannot do the work policy-makers would like it to do, and 
its invocation within policy spheres usually already signals a kind 
of developmental distress, a perceived need for retooling through a 
form of social engineering. In other words, while "culture" (in the 
anthropological sense) reflects and shapes the worldviews and 
institutional arrangements of this (or any) society, it cannot in and 
of itself solve society's most pressing challenges. That is, if we 
understand "culture" to be the totality of what people do, and not 
as some sphere of life that is separate from others, then we must 
understand it as ever-evolving based on changing experiences and 
contexts. 
"Soft Power" and Cultural Governance 
Foucault's notions of governmentality and biopower represent a 
rethinking of power as a field of multiple forces. In this view, the 
state is a contradictory ensemble of practices and processes of 
governance that manage both the subjugation of populations and 
the elaboration of subjectivities by naturalizing the arbitrary (1991, 
2003). For Foucault, governance is not only enacted in the juridical 
realm of law and policy, but also through the various institutions 
that discipline populations to have particular understandings of 
belonging and deviance, and in so doing, to accept the social 
hierarchies that shape those understandings (see also Bourdieu 
1984, 1998). Like Gramsci, Foucault is interested in the cultural 
dimensions of power - its unmaking and remaking - but he does 
not see civil society as distinct from political society. In other words, 
where Gramsci locates counter-hegemony within the public sphere 
of intellectual and (to some extent) popular artistic production, 
Foucault sees the power of the state as "capillary" (1979). For 
Foucault, there is no "outside," as the process of governance always 
shapes even the parameters of the imagination. Yet while the art of 
governmentality creates a particular configuration of possibilities, 
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subjects also work within this configuration to reshape it according 
to their own agendas. Thus, there is a sense of dynamism in relation 
to socio-political fields, within which actors at various levels both 
reproduce and re-produce relations of power, not only institu-
tionally but also informally. 
One of the ways that states become social actors in everyday 
life is through the establishment of national cultural narratives. 
That states "have actively engaged in the production of national 
fantasies of communitas" (Aretzaga 2003: 396) is amply 
demonstrated by the plethora of anthropological and historical 
studies of cultural policies, and the concomitant literature on 
cultural politics and cultural struggles.2 As an aspect of governance, 
cultural policy formulation embodies a form of social engineering 
because it creates blueprints for the generation of ideal citizens. 
Within Europe and the United States, cultural policy formulation 
has often been viewed as legitimating social hierarchies through 
metaphors of "distinction" or "taste" (Bourdieu 1984). However, 
within postcolonial contexts there has been a sense that cultural 
policy-making is a form of counter-hegemonic practice geared 
toward reorienting national sensibilities away from European 
colonial aesthetic hierarchies toward a valuation of that which is 
seen to be indigenously generated. This has especially been the case 
for states that have maintained complex political ties to empire 
during the post-colonial period (e.g. Puerto Rico, see Davila 1997), 
but is also a more general phenomenon in which newly-
independent states are faced with the prospect of defining cultural 
difference while maintaining significant political and economic 
connections. From the point of view of state officials, the emphasis 
here is on modernization with a difference. But citizens, of course, 
enact their own visions of cultural modernity both through and 
beyond the spaces made available to them by policy-makers. 
Virginia Dominguez (1992) has evocatively suggested that the 
whole enterprise of post-colonial cultural policy development is 
not, as it has generally been perceived, a counter-hegemonic act. 
Instead it represents a continuation of a form of European 
ideological hegemony that positions "culture" as a sphere of life 
separate from other spheres such as political organization, 
economic production, and technological innovation about which 
one might also formulate policies. This separation, she argues, is 
2 The literature on national cultures and cultural politics is too vast to list here, but 
for review essays, see Alonso 1994; Fox 1990; Foster 1991; Glick Schiller 1997; 
Slocum and Thomas 2003; Yelvington 2001. 
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what provides the basis for the consolidation of particular class 
interests in and through post-colonial development projects: 
Cultural policies in [post-colonial] countries don't just describe 
what there is that the government, the elites, or even the 
nonelites seek to value; they usually prescribe a particular 
direction the country should take' culturally' in order to correct 
for some perceived societal flaw, such as internalized 
oppression, technological backwardness, destructive ingroup 
fighting, or a lack of historical awareness (Dominguez 1992: 
36). 
In other words, in carving out a distinctive place for the elaboration 
of a cultural heritage, anti-colonial elites both cultivate a notion of 
cultural identity and legitimate structures of post-colonial political 
authority - two key dimensions of nationalist discourse that Percy 
Hintzen has already identified (1997). In this way, Hintzen argues, 
"national elites became the agents of modernity and the 
instruments of equality" (1997: 63) through a developmental 
discourse that masks post-colonial relations of power and 
undermines "the symbolic power of ethnic nationalism," which is 
essentially, in his view, a discourse of race (1997: 66). 
Indeed, in Jamaica the tension between blackness and creole 
multiracialism has informed cultural politics from establishment of 
Crown Colony rule to the present. On one hand, the early 
movement to cultivate a local aesthetic and promote a new vision of 
cultural citizenship remained wedded to British institutions and to 
the idea that these institutions would socialize the population 
within values that had, by then, been constructed as uniquely 
belonging to the middle classes - discipline, temperance, collective 
work, thrift, industry, Christian living, community uplift, and 
respect for the leadership of the educated middle classes. On the 
other hand, it gave symbolic primacy to historical events and select 
cultural practices deemed relevant to the majority of the population. 
This two-step emphasized social modernization with a difference -
the cultivation of "middle-class values," "respectable" family 
structures, community mobilization, and political participation 
would facilitate Jamaica's economic growth while the population 
learned to publicly value those aesthetic practices which had 
previously been denigrated by colonial authorities. 
Elsewhere, I outline the connections between broader political 
and economic initiatives and the development of a creole multi-
racial cultural nationalist project over time (Thomas 1999, 2004). 
Here, I will just mention that Seaga's first cultural policy in 1963 
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reflected an emphasis on presenting an indigenous cultural history 
(a "folk blackness") that was understood as constituting Jamaica's 
African heritage. This policy sought to increase access to 
participation in the arts and to provide an institutional infra-
structure for the preservation and presentation of the folk music, 
dances, games, and foods that had come to represent Jamaica's 
African heritage. However, the emphasis on a folk culture did not 
necessarily extend to support for lower- and working-class black 
Jamaicans' efforts toward racial and economic justice and self-
determination. While the government's legitimation of aspects of 
Jamaica's African cultural heritage broadened the public space in 
which notions of national identity could be debated, the actual 
process of privileging particular elements of Jamaica's African 
cultural heritage also marginalized alternative visions. The attempt 
to consolidate a nationalist state, to inculcate soon-to-be-ex-subjects 
with a sense of national belonging and loyalty that would naturalize 
new relations of authority, validated a particular kind of citizen and 
a specific vision of cultural "progress" and "development'' that 
prioritized creole multi-racial integration around the model of 
nationalist "respectability". Thus, Seaga's 1963 cultural policy 
reflected an apprehension, on the part of the nationalist leadership, 
about conceding symbolic ground to aspects of black Jamaicans' 
cultural productions within a country stratified along lines of race 
and class. This was particularly important during the early years of 
independence when the government needed to mobilize the 
population toward accepting a particular strategy of political and 
economic development, and at a time when the ideologies and 
mobilizing strategies of other sectors of the population potentially 
threatened the integrity of political parties' vision of multi-racial 
modernization and economic growth through the implementation 
of industrialization programmes (Lewis 1950, 1955). 
But this was not the only vision of progress available to 
Jamaicans at the time of independence or afterwards. Competing 
understandings of Jamaican identity and political struggle have 
been rooted in a sense of racialized (and to a degree, transnational) 
citizenship. Brian Meeks has conceptualized the jockeying for 
position between these two understandings of citizenship by noting 
that while leaders have tended to define social movements in 
relation to national or class identities, "the people have invariably 
redefined [them) in terms of race" (2000: 169). These conflicting 
positions are supported by different institutional spaces and are 
expressed through different cultural practices, and it is the struggle 
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between them that has shaped both the content of development 
policies, and the context within which they are conceived. For these 
reasons, we can think of the formulation of cultural policies as 
constituting what Toby Miller and George Yudice have called "a 
privileged terrain of hegemony": 
[Cultural policies] provide a means of reconciling contending 
cultural identities by holding up the nation as an essence that 
transcends particular interests. In keeping with the negotiated 
conflict that lies at the heart of hegemony, the cultural domain 
produces challenges from those sectors that the contingency of 
history has moved into contestatory positions (2002: 8). 
Cultural policy-making, in this view, provides a space in 
which to devise ways to relate the past to the present, and to a more 
emancipated future. However, it also seeks to organize and 
discipline populations through suggested behaviours toward the 
realization of a collective national subjectivity. It mobilizes a 
cultural identity for the national body, but masks the ways that 
"identity is a source of equality and simultaneously an instrument 
through which social and cultural hierarchies are reinforced" (Khan 
2004: 13). 
Cultural Policy Studies 
The emergence of cultural policy studies in the 1970s was facilitated 
by the global institutional framework of UNESCO, and reflected a 
concern with the relationships between economic and social policy-
making and the elaboration of a cultural framework for 
development. This was especially the case for the states that became 
politically independent after World War II. On one hand, the 
funding of conferences dedicated to the formulation of cultural 
policies reflected a nationalist common sense that the territorial 
reach of states should bound some set of unique (and shared) 
cultural practices and visions, practices and visions that should be 
identified and valued (Marriott 1963). On the other hand, the 1970s 
flurry of cultural policy development betrays a recognition of the 
need to provide a kind of bulwark against the ill effects of 
modernizationist projects (Rostow 1960, Parsons 1951, Upset and 
Bendix 1959), to protect "indigenous" aesthetic practices in the face 
of attempts to socialize people into an acceptance of a unilinear 
model of development that conceived of local cultures as 
"backward" but ultimately recuperable by their relocation to the 
categories of "heritage" or "patrimony." Cultural policy studies 
gained a political agenda through cultural studies (and critical 
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anthropology), most particularly through the destabilization of the 
idea that cultures exist as stable knowable entities that provide the 
foundations for identities. Stuart Hall's oft-invoked phrase that 
identities are always processes of "becoming" rather than states of 
"being" (1990) worked to transform paradigms that viewed cultures 
as functionally integrated and unchanging through time. 
In the contemporary period, cultural policy studies have 
generally been concerned with the place of cultural production 
within neo-liberal economic frameworks, mirroring UNESCO's 
1996 shift away from viewing the state as primarily a supplier of 
cultural services to the public, and toward the privatization or 
localization of cultural services (Wise 2002). This changed context 
requires increased attention to issues of hegemony and difference 
within national communities, which has led scholars to investigate 
the diminished role of the public sector in formulating ideas about 
cultural "goods." For example, Javier Stanziola's (2002) analysis of 
how the shift toward empowering non-profit organizations in Chile 
has led to a more pluralistic proliferation of cultural expressions 
reflects a broader transition that has been occurring throughout 
Latin America. Where early government support for cultural 
development initiatives tended to take a paternalistic approach to 
culture that was rooted in colonial history and that therefore 
emphasized the creation of "high art," since the 1970s there has 
been a move to diversify cultural initiatives. This move broadened 
the scope of cultural manifestations that were now included within 
the realm of nationalist representations, and was itself the result of 
increased schooling and literacy rates, the emergence of economies 
of scale resulting from more diversified economic development, the 
introduction of information technology, and the expansion of urban 
growth (Stanziola 2002). Within the new context, the state works 
more collaboratively with an emergent non-profit sector - and, in 
the case of Puerto Rico and elsewhere (Davila 1997, 2001), a private 
sector. 
Scholars interested in cultural policy have also begun to 
investigate the effects of cultural institutionalization. For example, 
Vincent Dubois (2004) analyzes the ways French cultural policy, 
institutionalized in the 1970s and 1980s, led to processes of cultural 
specialization, professionalization, and cultural "promotion" that 
turned the focus in cultural development initiatives from 
emphasizing "everyday" culture and local democracy to a more 
"technical" orientation, which in tum displaced local activists who 
had previously been at the forefront of these activities in favour of 
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a professional class of cultural arbiters. Institutionalization, within 
this context, also detached cultural mobilization from other sectors 
(youth, education, sports) and created new avenues for career 
specialization. For those who believed they could change social and 
political relations through cultural involvement, these transforma-
tions generated a broad sense of disillusionment. 
More generally, cultural policy scholars have concerned 
themselves with how the context of neo-liberal globalization has 
transformed cultural policy formulation toward the identification of 
cultural products to sell (through various kinds of arrangements) in 
a competitive global market. This is not only the case in many Latin 
American contexts (Yudice 2003), or in the United States (where it is 
framed as urban renewal), but also in countries like South Korea, 
where beginning in the mid-1990s the establishment of cultural 
identity has been geared toward promoting "a sense of com-
petitiveness within cultural industries in a global society" (Yim 
2002: 40). During the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea, culture was 
positioned as a motivating factor supporting the government's 
priority of achieving economic growth through an export-oriented 
industrialization strategy. Within this context, an emphasis on 
"traditional" values was seen to serve economic development. 
During the 1980s, when the growth strategy was reaching its peak, 
culture and the arts were re-conceptualized as solutions to social 
problems, and were mobilized in order to counter the effects of 
intensified materialism, commercialism, individualism, hedonism, 
and violence - "isms" seen as resulting from an influx of Western 
culture. Since the mid-1990s, the rationale for Korea's cultural 
policy has been rooted in the exchange value of culture, and as such 
the government has sought to promote contemporary arts and 
popular culture as a means to encourage "the creativity of the 
people," seen as an "important element of economic development 
in a knowledge-based information society" (Yim 2002: 44). 
In the Korean case (as well as others that I've cited here), we 
see a move toward diversifying the cultural content of what can 
legitimately represent the nation, toward working with civic non-
profit and private institutions to promote what is understood as 
"cultural development," and toward finding ways to be 
economically competitive within the contemporary global situation. 
This is a process that has also occurred in Jamaica. During the late 
1990s and early 2000s, for example, the Jamaican Cultural 
Development Commission began to move beyond an emphasis on 
preserving and presenting "folk culture" by co-sponsoring many of 
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the food festivals that were popping up in areas around the country 
and by spearheading the return of the Independence Day street 
dance. Beyond the specific actions taken in particular countries, 
however, more general questions have emerged, questions that 
have to do with why attention to "culture" takes on an urgency in 
particular moments and not others, and with how "culture" 
becomes seen as useful for "development" within specific contexts. 
These question require that we look more closely at the ways 
interested links are posited between "culture" and "development," 
an issue to which I will return later in this essay. 
Within the Anglophone Caribbean, the last two decades of 
economic crisis have eroded many of the previous gains in health 
and nutrition, literacy and education, employment and social 
services, gender empowerment and political stability (Barrow 1998; 
Dupuy 2001). Structural adjustment programmes have mandated 
repeated currency devaluations, which, alongside privatization 
drives, have resulted in a higher cost of living and an increase in 
poverty. Unemployment has escalated, especially among women 
and youth, and crime rates have skyrocketed, especially those 
related to drug trafficking and domestic violence. Caribbean 
nations, though rich in natural resources, are increasingly com-
peting with each other, in addition to competing as a region with 
other regions. The key economic sectors - agriculture, mineral 
extraction, offshore assembly production, and tourism - are 
dominated by foreign firms and are dependent on external demand 
or foreign consumers for their services. As a result, the region is 
increasingly reliant upon exporting more of its work force to the 
United States, and at the same time it is becoming a magnet for 
illegal drug trafficking and money laundering (Dupuy 2001: 524-
526, 529). Moreover, the shift to service- and information-based 
industries worldwide has increasingly encouraged female-
generated labour migration at the same time that local oppor-
tunities for both women and under-educated and unskilled young 
men have contracted. 
Since capital has become increasingly flexible and labour 
markets have become increasingly differentiated (within and across 
national borders), it has become more difficult for states throughout 
the Global South to provide for and socialize their citizens. As a 
result, many state functions have been redirected to new sites 
(Sassen 2000; Trouillot 2001 ). It has also become progressively more 
of a challenge for states to legislate the "cultural content" of the 
nation (Trouillot 2001). This represents a significant change from the 
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nationalist period, when cultural policy emerged as part of an 
attempt to provide institutional spaces that would help Jamaicans 
move beyond Euro-centric notions of cultural value at a time when 
many were worried about the extent to which the "pluralities" 
within Anglophone Caribbean societies hindered the creation of 
unified nation-states. The current context raises other concerns 
about the proliferation of violent crimes, about the paucity of 
avenues for economic development, and about a reassertion of 
racial and national hierarchies that recall earlier imperial moments. 
These are the concerns that shape the context for current efforts to 
reposition "culture" as useful for development. 
"Toward Jamaica, The Cultural Superstate" 
If context is everything, then it is striking that Jamaica's new 
cultural policy is introduced with an epigraph, Claude McKay's "If 
We Must Die." This poem was written in 1919 following the 
explosions of urban violence against blacks in cities across the 
United States. The "Red Summer" of 1919 reflected white backlash 
to the various changes wrought by World War I, such as the massive 
migration of African-Americans from south to north (which 
increased competition for factory jobs and transformed residential 
neighbourhoods), the return of black veterans whose experience of 
discrimination in America was made more bitter by the fact that 
they had just returned from fighting a war that was justified in 
terms of freedom and democracy, and the re-establishment of the 
Ku Klux Klan whose violent intimidation campaign played on 
white rage and fear, sentiments that were stoked by popular 
cultural products such as the film "Birth of a Nation." To begin with 
"If We Must Die," then, is to draw parallels between the racial 
terrorism of the post-World War I period in the United States and 
the contemporary moment in Jamaica. 
Indeed, the policy starts by outlining today's context, listing 
increased crime and violence, drug trafficking and Americanization 
as some of the urgent challenges facing Jamaicans: 
Jamaica must contend with the paradoxical opportunities and 
threats of globalization, the penetrating cultural presence of the 
United States with its influence on the cultural integrity and 
identity of our population, and the leadership role Jamaica 
must play in Caribbean cultural activities (9). 
The sense that Jamaica has a leadership role to play within the 
Caribbean is underlain by a more general and profound 
disillusionment with a creole nationalist project that has collapsed 
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(Bogues 2002; Carnegie 2002; Meeks 1994; Scott 1999). Within this 
context, the domain of "culture" is held up as a way to get back on 
track, to rebuild a national community in the face of both internal 
and external threats. And the invocation of the term "cultural 
superstate," though nowhere defined in the policy, could perhaps 
be seen as a call to action in this regard. 
The stated goals of the cultural policy are to affirm national 
identity and a sense of pride that is "founded in the historic courage 
and resilience of our people," to "foster the participation of all in 
national life and promote investment in national cultural 
development" (5), to "discover the things that make for peace and 
build up the modem life" (8); and to "reflect in its expression the 
notion of cultural excellence and international achievement that our 
people have established over the years" (8). The assumptions that 
undergird these goals are as follows: 1) Jamaica's social "chaos" is 
due, at least in part, to a lack of self-esteem and sense of belonging 
among the mass of (black) people; 2) this lack of self-esteem is due 
to the belittling of "things African" (and by corollary, "things 
Jamaican"), a belittling that is related to the persistence of colonial 
hierarchies of color and class as well as to contemporary global 
inequalities; 3) to develop self-esteem and a sense of belonging, it is 
necessary to engage people with events in their history and their 
cultural heritage with which they should identify; 4) higher self-
esteem will result in greater national pride; and, 5) greater national 
pride will lead not only to a more productive economy, but will also 
strengthen people's ability to "live wetl together." 
Culture, here, is seen as an active force, one that has the ability 
to transform both intimate and public domains: 
Culture must therefore be used positively to motivate 
community action and enrich and animate community life so 
that they may willingly engage in nation building. It is the only 
means to achieve sustainable development (24). 
Yet, this concept of culture - as a sphere of action that is separate 
from, and therefore able to autonomously influence, other spheres 
- raises some critical problems. Within the policy, culture is defined 
as "the way of life of a people," as "the dynamic reservoir of ways 
of thinking and doing accumulated over time" and "the knowledge, 
experience, beliefs, values, customs, traditions, distinctive institu-
tions and its ways of making meaning in life" (Ministry, 9). Here, 
there is an emphasis on a holistic and dynamic definition of culture 
as "what people do" in all spheres of life. But this is an emphasis 
that is difficult to sustain. The policy goes on to also argue that 
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culture "is central to the definition of the basic unit of economic 
development - the individual and the human spirit - and the 
eventual unleashing of creative energies" (9-10). With this, we 
move from a generically anthropological definition of culture to an 
instrumental one - one, in fact, that links culture and economic 
development in ways that are reminiscent of mid-twentieth century 
modernizationist paradigms. In this way, "culture" becomes a 
problem to be solved, and at the same time, the basis for solutions. 
This is quite a lot of work for one concept to do. 
In spite of a stated desire to maintain a holistic concept of 
culture, the new cultural policy often slips into more instru-
mentalist visions that maintain two rather static visions of culture. 
The first - culture as possession - usually manifests as com-
mentary regarding cultural "loss" and pleads a "return to values." 
This commentary positions Jamaican culture as an entity that is 
"under siege" by "foreign cultural influences" that are running 
rampant and unfettered. The second - culture as having 
purportedly "positive" or "negative" elements, or as UNESCO 
Representative Simon A. Clarke put it during the 1996 consultations 
in Kingston, as "either a help or a hindrance to overall 
development" - often maps specific cultural practices onto 
particular groups of people. In this way, racial, ethnic, and class 
antagonisms are coded through the language of culture, and are 
further obscured through discourses of multiculturalism. This 
slippage produces three tensions that provide an animating 
structure for the discussions of challenges and potential 
interventions throughout the new policy. 
Culture is Dynamic v. Culture has Boundaries 
This first tension underlies the assertions that there are "unique 
cultural manifestations and distinctive style that can be considered 
to be quintessentially Jamaican" (Ministry, 5), or that there is a 
Jamaican "cultural integrity" (9) that can be penetrated - and 
subsequently diluted and made inauthentic - by other ("foreign") 
cultures. From this vantage point, "culture" needs to be protected 
by the government, which, it is argued, must 
recognize, protect and promote all cultural expressions and 
products developed by the Jamaican people in the course of 
our history, including all forms of African retentions, 
European-based traditions, intellectual expressions and 
products, nation language, Rastafarianism, folklore, jerk 
concept, et al, including any form or expression notable or 
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recognizable as Jamaican and which would be a source of 
national pride and identity (17). 
The sense here is that Jamaican culture is quantifiable and 
recognizable, though the terms of this recognition are unclear. On 
one hand, what is recognized is a sense of heritage - "our 
connection to our past" (29) - which, as the "reservoir of creativity 
in Jamaican society" (30), is to provide inspiration for action in the 
present. But the framing of culture as heritage always puts us in the 
bind of viewing change as loss. That is, if "heritage" implies that 
there exists a cauldron filled with cultural practices developed in 
the past that we can now draw upon to confront contemporary 
situations, then change must mean loss. This equation evokes a kind 
of Herskovitsian model of culture as a quantifiable series of traits 
that might be retained, reinterpreted, or abandoned, rather than a 
more processual view of cultural transformation that instead 
privileges people's own creativity and responsiveness to a broader 
context (Gilroy's "changing same," or Mintz and Price's "under-
lying grammatical principles"). 
But "heritage" is important in the cultural policy not only 
because of the kinds of insights past practices may bring to bear on 
the present, but also because it is a potential source of income. In 
assessing the extent to which public and private agencies have 
mobilized to showcase Jamaica's heritage to a global audience (by 
gaining recognition, for example, as a UNESCO World Heritage 
Site), the policy concludes that "there have been serious inade-
quacies as over the last few years we have failed to capitalize on our 
heritage product for economic advantage" (30). With this statement, 
heritage becomes "product," a commodity for sale in a competitive 
global marketplace, and as with all products, we must then be 
concerned with uniqueness and quality control. This raises the issue 
of "authenticity," a concept that comes up in several places 
throughout the policy. For example, it is argued that we must 
"assure authenticity" in relation to "traditional knowledge bearers" 
(30), that within the tourism industry we must promote a "more 
authentic cultural expression of the Jamaican people" (38), and that 
when training tourist workers, we must ensure "the authenticity of 
our product and information" (39). Whereas in an earlier moment, 
claims to "cultural authenticity" were "a crucial element in 
resistance to colonialism" (Khan 2004: 11), providing the tools to 
dismantle colonial assertions that black and brown West Indians 
were either culture-less or culturally inferior, these claims are now 
mobilized mainly within the frame of commodification. Yet 
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defining the "authenticity" of a particular product or practice is 
never a neutral proposition, but involves a process of external 
evaluation that, as many scholars have pointed out, is always 
interested and always reflects a political agenda (Jackson 2005). 
The tension between viewing culture as either dynamic or 
bounded also emerges in relation to the policy's approach to social 
engineering. It is argued that the cultural policy must "be 
concerned about the type of person we seek to shape through our 
culture, education and social systems" (10). The view of culture as 
dynamic is reflected in the statement that "we create the culture that 
simultaneously creates us" (10), yet a more and more bounded 
vision emerges as the policy outlines the need to "seek consensus on 
the Jamaican person that we need to create" (10). According to the 
policy, this person is ideally committed to national and regional 
development, should understand Jamaica and the region, should 
"assume his/her role in the unending process that is called human 
development'' (11), should know the history of Jamaica and the 
Caribbean and should see him/herself both in national and regional 
terms, should be multi-lingual so he or she can be "competitive in a 
global economy" (11), should recognize "his/her place within the 
cultural diversity of Jamaica and thereby promote tolerance, respect 
for others, and peace in communities," and should be "open to 
experiencing other cultures" (11). 
The focus on developing particular kinds of citizens is where 
the policy is most explicit about its disciplinary objective. Here, the 
aim is to generate the sense that the state is not outside its citizens, 
but is imminent within each of us (Althusser 1971). This becomes 
more transparent if we raise the questions that haunt each of the 
above statements: How would a commitment to national and 
regional development be learned and subsequently manifested? 
What are the aspects of Jamaica and the region that must be 
understood? What is our role in the process of human 
development? What aspects of Jamaican and Caribbean history 
should be foregrounded? How do we come to find our "place" in 
relation to other sub-national communities, and does this 
necessarily breed peaceful respect? And finally, how "open" should 
Jamaicans be to "other cultures"? Which ones, and in what ways? 
None of the answers to these questions are givens, yet calling 
attention to the processes of naturalizing ideological positions into 
"common sense" also allows us to make visible how broader power 
dynamics shape the notions of appropriateness, "authenticity," and 
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value that are institutionalized through the educational system and 
other civil society spheres. 
These dynamics hide in commentary such as the argument 
that the cultural policy "must also reflect on the inflated, even 
destructive air of superiority or distorted sense of being by certain 
sections of our population, also as a result of slavery and 
colonialism" (8). To be sure, what is being quietly referenced here 
are the internal hierarchies of class and color that are so acutely felt 
by Jamaicans of all stripes, but rooting these hierarchies only in 
relation to historical processes of slavery and colonialism obscures 
the ways they are actively produced and reproduced in the present 
at multiple levels (locally, nationally, and internationally) and in 
various institutional sites. 
Promoting Cultural Diversity v. Protecting Cultural Integrity 
This brings me to the second of three tensions, that between the 
"promotion of cultural diversity as an important element of 
national identity" (9) and the sense that Jamaicans must be 
protected vis-a-vis those "foreign" cultural influences assumed to 
be deleterious to the cultivation of the ideal citizen delineated 
above. This tension is most evident in discussions about the arts 
and the idea of cultural loss or endangerment: 
On one hand, communities benefit from contact with other 
cultures, receiving a kind of cultural stimulation and 
fertilization from this exposure and openness. On the other 
hand however, cultures in communities require special 
considerations and programmes for their development and 
may be endangered by the imposition or dominance of other 
cultures, especially those of more technologically advanced 
societies (10). 
The policy thus suggests that there is an important equilibrium to 
be maintained between embracing cosmopolitanism and valuing 
that which is considered to be distinctly Jamaican, that there must 
be a way to be global on Jamaicans' own terms. 
With the following statement, the policy also implicitly 
alludes to the global dimensions of racial prejudice and 
discrimination by defining those elements of Jamaican experience 
that should be privileged: 
While not restricting our global capacity, there is a need to 
foster and promote as a means of priority our Caribbean and 
African international identity, while mindful of the importance 
of all other aspects of our diverse reality (14). 
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A delicate balance is being performed here, a two-step that 
seeks to privilege the histories, cultural practices, and experiences 
of black Jamaicans without undoing the creole model of national 
cultural identity. This issue arises again in the discussion of 
"excellence" (the assertion that Jamaica is likkle but tallawah). 
Excellence, the policy states, is the 
reflection of the undying, unrelenting spirit of a people 
determined to rise from the ashes of enslavement to the 
prowess that was the history of their earlier civilization. It is 
the embodiment of that vigour and energy that fashioned the 
tales of protest and rebellion so notable in the pages of our 
history (18). 
Here, "prowess" is attributed to Jamaicans' African heritage, which 
while unstated, is positioned as the fount not only of a history of 
protest and rebellion, but also of current achievements worldwide. 
By carefully privileging blackness in these two examples, diversity 
emerges within the policy as a problem in two registers 
internally and internationally. 
Internally, diversity is a problem of national inclusion or 
exclusion. The policy recognizes over and over again that Jamaica 
is "composed of several and varied communities, each with its own 
cultural characteristics" (9), and that therefore a national cultural 
identity must "include aspects of each community as they interact 
to create a common system of being, thinking and doing, and the 
individual's cultural identity will be based on his/her familiarity 
with the cultural characteristics of the community of which s/he is a 
part as well as in relation to the surrounding community/-
communities" (9). The national motto is invoked to talk about the 
"historical reality" of Jamaicans who were "forced to discover ways 
and means to live together in relative racial and cultural harmony" 
(16). However, the problem that is identified within the cultural 
policy is that the diversity of Jamaica "can only be successfully 
expressed if each community is afforded opportunities to promote 
their specific and unique identity and expression" (16), but that 
"over the years our formal processes have emphasized our 
European past far more than our African, Indian, Chinese and other 
heritage" (29). Appeals to creolization, therefore, have not been seen 
to remove the conditions that have made possible a continued 
marginalization of (especially) cultural practices that are seen as 
"African" in derivation. 
This is because, as most recent work on creolization has 
maintained, cultural mixing does not occur in a vacuum, but is 
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shaped by broader power dynamics (Khan 2001; Puri 2004; Sheller 
2003). By emphasizing processes of rupture and creativity, and by 
stressing the development of a shared cultural and social repertoire 
that could provide the basis for a national identity, much of the 
early work on creolization tended to obscure the actual conflicts 
that occurred and power relations that shaped these developments 
(Bolland 1997; Price 1998). In fact, the process of creolization has 
taken place within historical and contemporary relations of 
domination and subordination at local, regional, national, and 
global levels (Mintz 1996; Mintz and Price 1992). These dynamic 
relations of power have constrained the extent to which the various 
visions, practices, and aesthetic norms of particular groups (in the 
case at hand, lower-class black Jamaicans) have been represented 
within the creole formation at any given moment. This is implicitly 
referenced by the policy when it calls for the government to "foster 
and promote opportunities for full expression of Jamaica's vibrant 
grassroots culture, recognizing the contribution of this sector to the 
dynamic Jamaican product that we now boast" (17). Here, we see a 
recognition that ideologies of creole-ness have tended to obscure 
actually existing (racial, class, and ethnic) inequalities. 
Shalini Puri extends this point in her study of the centrality of 
notions of hybridity in Caribbean nationalist treatises more 
generally. "Discourses of hybridity," she argues, "perform several 
functions:" 
They elaborate a syncretic New World identity, distinct from 
that of its 'Mother Cultures'; in doing so, they provide a basis 
for national and regional legitimacy. Second, they offer a way 
of balancing and/or displacing discourses of equality, which 
has led to their importance in many instances for securing 
bourgeois hegemony. Third, discourses of hybridity have been 
implicated in managing racial politics - either by promoting 
cultural over racial hybridity or by producing racial mixtures 
acceptable to the elite. For all these reasons, post-colonial 
nationalisms in the Caribbean have canonized nonthreatening 
hybridities such as those embodied at particular times by the 
callaloo, the creole, and the mestizo (Puri 2004: 45). 
Puri suggests, however, that we might productively read hybridity 
discourses as manifestos, as hopeful visions of what Aisha Khan has 
identified as "democratic (equal) political representation, a 
cosmopolitan worldview, and therefore consummate modernity in 
a global context" (Khan 2004: 8). Indeed, this is the kind of reading 
that provides a basis for imagining that a cultural policy could 
make a difference in the ways people think about their relationships 
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to cultural practice, to each other, and to national structures of 
material and ideological power. 
Because there is often an unwillingness to talk about these 
structures in explicit terms, the power dynamic shaping both 
cultural expression and the formulation of cultural policy is often 
displaced to dynamics occurring outside the purported cultural 
boundaries of the nation-state. In other words, if diversity is 
something that must be carefully managed internally, it is all the 
more critical to intervene to protect Jamaican cultural integrity from 
what is often portrayed as a foreign (US) cultural "invasion," while 
at the same time acknowledging how important particular cultural 
"interactions" have been: 
Our cultural diversity has been enriched not only by the strong 
spiritual forces that have co-habited within our borders ... but 
also by the constant interaction with foreign cultures over the 
years (16). 
By privileging "interaction," the policy positions a particular sense 
of cultural transformation, one in which the partners in the process 
of cultural exchange are more or less equally positioned. From this 
point of view, it becomes important to call for the government "to 
provide and promote opportunities for Jamaicans to engage or 
interact with foreign cultures" (17), and to "provide for our people 
opportunities to experience the excellence of foreign cultural 
expressions through exchanges and co-production agreements both 
within our shores and in other parts of the world" (19). 
However, this sense of interaction also feeds into a notion that 
cultures are bounded (that "foreign" cultures are not always 
already present within Jamaica), and that therefore there are 
instances in which cultural interaction would be perceived as a 
threat. This is what leads the policy to emphasize the development 
of stronger links between the educational system and cultural 
institutions in the section on "Culture and Education." It is posited 
that if there were a greater "cultural component in the school's 
curricula" (26) and if youth learned more about Jamaican history, 
then Jamaicans would be empowered "to participate fully in 
national development" (27). Again, this places the burden of social 
and economic development on "culture" rather than on, say, a good 
land reform or job creation policy. 
What is even more critical, though, is the assumption that 
what underlies the "upsurge in violence and anti-social behaviour" 
(26) about which people are justifiably concerned is a cultural 
absence, one that is "aggravated by the extensive diet of foreign 
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influences provided to [youth] by an expanding cable market" (27). 
That youth are singled out as especially vulnerable is made clear in 
the following passage: 
This [media expansion] has serious implications for a Jamaica 
whose population is essentially a young one, with more than 
60% of the Jamaican population comprised of persons in the 0-
30 age cohort. This group represents active participation in the 
cultural process. They watch more television, use the internet 
and consume certain cultural products like popular music, and 
are usually confronted with a wider range of social and 
cultural problems (27). 
These issues resurface in the "Culture, Technology, and Media" 
section of the policy, where it is stated that: 
One of the fundamental challenges of culture from age to age is 
the tension between traditional knowledge as promoted and 
upheld by societies and transmitted, largely through orature to 
the next generation as somewhat sacrosanct, and the quasi-
sacrilegious embracing of new technologies by the now 
generation" (41). 
The idea presented here is that "local cultures, especially in 
developing societies like Jamaica, are at risk of disappearing as the 
young embrace the new values and realities brought to their living 
room by way of these new technologies. Because of these 
technologies, our societies, and especially our young, are constantly 
bombarded by foreign influences and values" (41). 
In these two areas, the policy links current "anti-social" trends 
in the behavioural patterns of children and youth in Jamaica 
directly to "worrying deficits in their social skills, personal integrity, 
self and national awareness," and relates these "deficits" to 
"declining parental care and supervision, the absence of positive 
role models and deficiencies in the formal and informal educational 
and cultural systems" (27). The argument here is that there is a 
direct correlation between "alternative communications media, 
drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, and, increasingly, to crime and 
violence" (27). 
That all of Jamaica's most pressing social problems are here 
attributed to US media is striking in the degree to which it rehearses 
Frankfurt School critiques of the centrality of mass culture and 
mediation to the social reproduction of domination. Moreover, the 
vision that youth are somehow endangered and uncritical 
consumers reflects an inability to think through the ways local 
hierarchies of power shape the assessment that "foreign cultural 
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influences" are solely negative. The fact that youth often 
symbolically occupy the contested terrain of nationalists' deferred 
(or even derailed) development dreams does not preclude them 
from elaborating their own. In other words, on one hand, current 
processes of globalization throughout the Caribbean have 
generated increased rates of violent crime, unemployment, and 
poverty at the same time as structural adjustment programs have 
reduced government expenditure on health care, education, literacy 
programs, and other social services thereby heightening conditions 
of instability for the majority of Jamaican families. On the other 
hand, contemporary neo-liberal capitalist development has also 
created new possibilities for realizing ambition, and new oppor-
tunities for advancing new or previously marginalized ideologies 
and practices regarding citizenship and subjectivity. 
In Jamaica, for example, youth have actively (if not 
intentionally) worked to transform aspects of old colonial 
hierarchies of race and gender, in part through their consumption 
and re-signification of aspects of African-American cultural 
production and style, and in part through a renegotiation of public 
representations through the space of dancehall. Indeed, many of 
the young people among whom I have conducted research believe 
that the circulation of ideas, practices, and styles between Jamaica 
and the United States is reciprocal, if unevenly so. Because they felt 
that as much as America had influenced Jamaican culture, 
Jamaicans also influenced culture in the United States, they tended 
to have a somewhat different outlook than either the older 
generation of middle-class professionals or the generation of 
working-class Jamaicans politicized by the various social move-
ments during the 1970s. Contrary to the dominant image of the 
culturally bombarded and besieged Jamaican, powerless either to 
resist or critique that which is imposed from "elsewhere" - the 
image often proliferated by those who disparaged the growing 
influence of the United States - these youth often asserted to me 
that David could not only challenge Goliath, but could also 
influence what Goliath listened to, how he dressed, and what he 
liked. In other words, youth critically engage the full range of 
cultural practices and mediations with which they come into 
contact. 
Nevertheless, the antidotes to Jamaica's various social ills that 
are presented in the cultural policy are to "encourage the 
development of programmes that reinforce the attitudes and values 
relevant and necessary for social cohesion and peaceful co-
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existence, devising as well policies and programmes to arrest the 
negative and dysfunctional cultural values and practices to which 
children and young people are increasingly and uniquely sus-
ceptible" (28), to "give direction and support to programmes that 
encourage children and youth to think creatively and to learn about 
diverse cultures in order to encourage national pride and openness 
to other cultures, nurture a sense of national identity and awareness 
and foster tolerance and respect and faith in one's own culture" (28), 
and to "strengthen and consolidate domestic experiences of local 
expression in order to reduce the impact of these foreign cultural 
products" (41). These formulations reproduce the idea that youth 
are particularly endangered, reflecting a more general problem -
the inability to see their aspirations (expressed through their 
cultural productions and practices) as valid expressions of their 
understanding of their own social positions. 
It is true that one of the hallmarks of the current period is that 
media is perhaps more central to the formation of social worlds and 
imaginative possibilities (Appadurai 1991). However, ethnographic 
research might help us to move beyond the panic that is palpable 
within the cultural policy by giving us a sense of how media 
operates within wider social fields, and allowing us to see "not only 
how media are embedded in people's quotidian lives but also how 
consumers and producers are themselves imbricated in discursive 
universes, political situations, economic circumstances, national 
settings, historical moments, and transnational flows" (Ginsburg et 
al. 2002). In this way, we might be more attuned to the processes of 
negotiation that surround media consumption, and less likely to 
position media as transcendently powerful. 
Cultural Practices v. Cultural Goods 
This last tension reflects the difficulty of reconciling an anthro-
pological understanding of culture with a market-driven vision of 
cultural goods, especially in relation to what might be thought of as 
the "goals" of these two approaches. That there is tension between 
the competing notions of culture as a commodity that can be 
exploited for national development within the global marketplace, 
and culture as uncommodifiable and central to shaping the life-
dynamic is acknowledged in the poiicy's section on Cultural 
Industries and Entrepreneurship: 
One of the challenges that face culture is the tension between 
cultural practices or expression that form a natural base for the 
social and spiritual order of their community and the 
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translation of that knowledge/expression into tools/goods/-
services/products for economic power and development (32). 
The pervasiveness of the market-oriented vision within the cultural 
policy - and particularly in the sections on Cultural Industries, 
Culture and Trade, and Culture and Tourism - is the result of a 
new move whereby capitalizing on "culture" is seen as a strategy 
that might replace traditional industries (seen as in a phase of 
decline) in mitigating the effects of globalization. 
The argument presented is that Jamaica's cultural industries 
are potentially critical to new economic growth strategies and 
might, "if developed through greater and concentrated invest-
ment ... provide a real alternative to failing traditional industries" 
(6). The contention that Jamaicans should benefit from exploiting 
their "culture" is justified through assertions that others (such as 
the US recording industry) already are: 
It is ironic that our cultural products continue to be under-
valued here at home even when they have crossed borders and 
established significant market niches in a large number of 
developed countries. Our products in music are played 
everywhere while many of our images, textiles, fashion, 
traditional knowledge and dances are the subjects of or have 
inspired documentaries, films, sculptures and art works in 
those societies (36). 
The parallel to these observations lies in the policy's recognition of 
the dual role of the Jamaican diaspora in relation to economic 
development. On one hand, the policy emphasizes that Jamaicans 
abroad should be included in "the processes, programmes and 
strategies geared to nation building" (14). On the other hand, the 
importance of what Louise Bennett called "reverse colonization" is 
also acknowledged, and the government is called upon to position 
"our cultural products, like our people, in the global markets of the 
world, to national economic, social and cultural advantage" (14). 
Again, the idea here is that Jamaica "exports" so many people who 
have made significant and publicly recognized contributions to the 
world in the realm of sports, art, academia, and science without 
those contributions redounding back to Jamaica. 
The policy therefore promotes a kind of FUBU ("for us, by 
us")3 initiative through which Jamaican cultural products and 
3 FUBU is an extremely popular hip hop clothing brand that was started by four 
young African-American men in New York City, and that uses notions of 
community identity and solidarity both to define itself as different from the 
mainstream and to sell itself as a racially-specific commodity in a global 
marketplace. 
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Jamaican cultural industries would be supported and protected, 
even while taking advantage of new technologies and networks: 
Now there is an even greater need to ensure that more of our 
stories are told, and by us ... Our people need to see ourselves 
in film and on television, hear our voices on radio networks 
and through all communications media, to take the message as 
far afield as we would, based on provisions made through the 
global network (21-22). 
Further, the policy argues that by encouraging cultural 
entrepreneurship among, in particular, lower-class youth, the 
cultural industries might play a role "in the reduction of poverty 
and violence and the promotion of youth employment in Jamaica" 
(7, see also Kelley 1997). Yet it is difficult to see specifically how this 
kind of entrepreneurship might be promoted and talent channeled 
(beyond encouraging participation in festivals like CARIFESTA and 
PANAFEST).4 
Where the policy is clearer in this regard is in its discussion of 
cultural tourism. Here, the policy promotes the (environmentally-
sustainable) development of heritage sites, the coordination of 
educational and cultural agencies in tourist areas, the marketing of 
"Jamaica's cultural goods and services" (40) within hotels and 
tourism centres, and the provision (for tourists) of "real 
opportunities to enjoy the people's way of life in communities, and 
experience the cultural traditions and expressions for which 
Jamaica is well known" (38). Yet two issues remain unaddressed. 
First, while the policy indicts the expansion of the all-inclusive 
sector for making it more difficult for smaller properties, 
restaurants, and craft vendors to stay afloat, these concerns are not 
addressed in the position statements. And second, international 
attention to Jamaica's high rates of violent crime makes its tourism 
industry vulnerable within a competitive region. How, within this 
context, will cultural tourism and cultural industries more broadly 
replace sugar, bauxite, bananas and coffee? FTZs and remittances? 
What does it mean, ultimately, to sell "culture" in a global 
marketplace? And what are the long-term possibilities and 
constraints of building an economy around this particular niche? 
4 CARIFESTA is the Caribbean Festival of the Arts, first held in 1972 in 
Georgetown, Guyana, and is designed to showcase the creative and artistic skills 
of the member countries of CARICOM, as well as the wider Caribbean and its 
diasporas. 
PANAFEST is a biennial festival of arts and culture that is held in Guyana that is 
designed to promote Pan-Africanism. 
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Conclusion 
These questions bring us back to the initial concern with the 
purported relationships between cultural development and 
economic growth, and with the ways cultural citizenship is always 
mapped in relation to broader development goals. These are 
relationships that, as Michaeline Crichlow (2005) and others have 
pointed out, change over time as both state actors and state subjects 
reformulate their relationships to development initiatives. Post-
independence cultural policy-making in Jamaica was geared 
toward changing people's minds about Jamaica's African heritage. 
This was done in order to shift ideas about relative cultural value 
that were institutionalized throughout the colonial period in the 
hopes of spurring economic development. While this project has 
been of critical importance, many of the people in the community 
where my research is based did not feel that the cultural project was 
sufficiently bolstered by an economic one. That is, they felt that the 
economic policies pursued since independence did not appreciably 
change people's positions within Jamaica's colour-class-culture nexus. 
Despite the various shifts within ethnic divisions of labour that 
arose as a result of policies pursued during the 1970s as well as later 
privatization initiatives, many community members felt that the 
lives of poorer Jamaicans remain institutionally structured in 
disadvantageous ways that were reminiscent of the colonial period. 
In this respect, valuing a cultural heritage could do little, as they 
didn't believe that the answer to their problems lay in plumbing the 
past for moral lessons. 
What Alan Stanbridge's study of cultural policy in England 
shows us is that neither the economistic model of cultural 
development (promoting the economic potential of the arts) nor the 
paternalistic model (promoting "excellence" in artistic expression) 
has been successful in transforming notions of cultural value, 
despite England's official emphasis on multiculturalism (2002). 
These transformations, while supported by cultural and 
educational initiatives, must ultimately be generated through real 
political and economic change on a global scale. Within Jamaica's 
current context, then, as Crichlow argues, it should not be 
surprising that people seem to be "interested in agendas which aid 
them in seeing through the state" (2005: 226), rather than those 
seeking to align them directly with particular state projects and 
visions. 
Yet the new cultural policy continues to struggle with these 
issues, while also attempting to identify the spaces within the global 
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economy where Jamaican culture might find a market. Despite the 
various critiques I've made throughout this essay, the new policy 
does raise many important issues (several of which I've not 
discussed here, such as the importance of foregrounding 
environmental concerns in cultural development initiatives, and the 
need to strengthen copyright and intellectual property protections). 
Moreover, within the current global political economy, there seem 
to be few alternative avenues through which economic growth 
might be promoted. In fact, several other countries are attempting 
to begin harnessing the economic potential of what they are 
referring to as "soft power," a sort of Gramscian understanding of 
the ways particular kinds of cultural products - such as Japanese 
children's toys, cartoons, and anime - shape global cultural 
imaginaries beyond the conventional sense of political influence 
(Anne Allison, personal communication). 
Yet, we would do well to reposition the development of self-
esteem and national pride and the prioritizing of cultural industries 
in economic development as separate issues. There is a hazard to 
invoking "culture" as a vehicle for the cultivation of pride that 
would then presumably give people a greater stake in national 
economic futures. This is because it implies that "culture" is 
something more profound than "what people do," something that 
is merely a proxy for other identities and social positions (such as 
race, class, nationality) that then become naturalized. This is Walter 
Benn Michaels' (1995) argument against the way anthropologist 
James Clifford supported Mashpee claims to Native American 
status, claims that would then afford them particular land rights as 
delineated by the US government. In his attempt to destabilize 
assertions that the Mashpee claimants no longer participated in 
cultural practices that were thought to be "traditionally" Mashpee 
and therefore were not eligible for land rights, Clifford (1988) 
argued that because culture is not fixed, the legitimacy of cultural 
identities should not be judged in relation to the cultural practices 
of past generations. While this argument would appear to be in line 
with more general anthropological critiques of essentialism, 
Michaels argues that instead it propagates a different kind of 
essentialism. For Michaels, the danger of Clifford's argument is that 
it roots Mashpee-ness in something that precedes cultural practice, 
thereby also fixing relationships between people beyond sociality. 
In other words, cuiture is flexible and fluid, but if we can then say 
that there is something about Mashpee-ness that is transcendent, we 
are invoking biology, and therefore slipping into older essentialisms 
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that grounded racist assumptions and practice. When we imply that 
there are some things that are so fundamentally Jamaican that they 
shouldn't change, that they can't change, or when we assert that 
cultural change can be engineered to support other kinds of goals, 
we risk trafficking in similar assumptions. Positioning culture 
outside of practice, and more importantly, outside contexts of 
practice, forestalls a more nuanced and complex analysis of social 
process. 
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